In today's Guardian, Alaa Al Aswany concocted a rather ludicrous conspiratory fantasy. He suggests that the Western media take the 'Silver Ring Thing' seriously and that if the same tosh had been uttered by a Muslim it would be condemned as mysoginist. Of course, Al Aswany doesn't seem to disagree with the 'Silver Ring Thing' and, in fact, it says that it's in line with Muslim Arab culture. His only concern is that, when chastity is spoken of by white Christians, the media are respectful, but not so when it's promoted by Muslims. That's nonsense. The 'Silver Ring Thing' has been duly made fun of for a number of years. It's a movement mostly present in the States and rather unsuccessful given the latest stats on teen pregnacies and venereal diseases. The European media cover it for its comic angle not because they take it seriously. Quite rightly too as they are extremely reductionist in their interpretation of chastity itself.
In another flight of fancy, Al Aswany complains that the Western media make a fuss about the alleged vote rigging in Iran and not in Egypt. That might be because the opposition to the Iranian elections' results did not start in the West, but in Iran itself. Indeed the media should be reporting more of what happens in the world, including Europe, but that's hardly because of biases.
The nonsense becomes farce when he goes on to accuse the Western media of having double standards because a woman murdered by a racist is not given the same salience than one murdered by the Iranian authorities, while protesting in the name of democracy. A woman dies as a result of domestic violence every three days. They are not made into martyrs in the news. Spurious comparisons do not prove bias.
Al Aswany might be supporting a liberal religion and democracy, although he doesn't seem to have a grasp of either. More importantly, in his dismissal of the Western media, he fails to understand the key role of the questioning of practices and ideas, be they political or religious, which are the backbone of liberal democracy.
13 July 2009
Faith and reason - a 'metaphysical mistake
I was happily resting from blogging when Karen Armstrong’s confused article on faith and belief managed to wake me up. I fear Karen Armstrong has made quite a ‘metaphysical mistake’ in her article on belief and reason (‘Metaphysical mistake’).
Armstrong states that in Greek thought there were two ways to the ‘truth’: one through mythos (myth) and one through logos (reason). The former was a more psychological (affective?) way to the truth, whilst the latter a more pragmatic mode of thought. She forgets to say that myth progressively lost importance as logos gained more, and affirms somewhat arbitrarily that myth was first and foremost a ‘programme of action’, especially within a religious context. Since when?
This, however, is certainly not true. Myths have always conveyed a truth, but not necessarily stirred one to act. Religious practice is not the fruit of religious mythologies; rather they are often born out of in the practical realities of a society and are certainly developed through practical reason.
Most concerning of all, however, Armstrong’s belief that theologians never worried about ‘proving’ God’s existence. Theologians, imbued with Aristotelic thinking, employed philosophy, the science of the day, to argue the existence of God. Thus, they defined God as First Cause, for example. Armstrong seems to engage in an exercise of apologetics (a neo-Platonic one!) instead of recognising that the birth of modern science would have not been possible had religious authorities not adopted (and monopolised) science. The confusion of belief and faith comes from an obtuse understanding and practice of both science and religion. The transcendent cannot be put under the microscope, yet this does not mean that it cannot be enquired by different means, as in the case of mathematical analysis or physics. The religious’ quest, on the other hand, should not stop at affirming God’s existence, but seek to unravel morality for humankind.
Armstrong states that in Greek thought there were two ways to the ‘truth’: one through mythos (myth) and one through logos (reason). The former was a more psychological (affective?) way to the truth, whilst the latter a more pragmatic mode of thought. She forgets to say that myth progressively lost importance as logos gained more, and affirms somewhat arbitrarily that myth was first and foremost a ‘programme of action’, especially within a religious context. Since when?
This, however, is certainly not true. Myths have always conveyed a truth, but not necessarily stirred one to act. Religious practice is not the fruit of religious mythologies; rather they are often born out of in the practical realities of a society and are certainly developed through practical reason.
Most concerning of all, however, Armstrong’s belief that theologians never worried about ‘proving’ God’s existence. Theologians, imbued with Aristotelic thinking, employed philosophy, the science of the day, to argue the existence of God. Thus, they defined God as First Cause, for example. Armstrong seems to engage in an exercise of apologetics (a neo-Platonic one!) instead of recognising that the birth of modern science would have not been possible had religious authorities not adopted (and monopolised) science. The confusion of belief and faith comes from an obtuse understanding and practice of both science and religion. The transcendent cannot be put under the microscope, yet this does not mean that it cannot be enquired by different means, as in the case of mathematical analysis or physics. The religious’ quest, on the other hand, should not stop at affirming God’s existence, but seek to unravel morality for humankind.
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