Faith and reason - a 'metaphysical mistake

I was happily resting from blogging when Karen Armstrong’s confused article on faith and belief managed to wake me up. I fear Karen Armstrong has made quite a ‘metaphysical mistake’ in her article on belief and reason (‘Metaphysical mistake’).
Armstrong states that in Greek thought there were two ways to the ‘truth’: one through mythos (myth) and one through logos (reason). The former was a more psychological (affective?) way to the truth, whilst the latter a more pragmatic mode of thought. She forgets to say that myth progressively lost importance as logos gained more, and affirms somewhat arbitrarily that myth was first and foremost a ‘programme of action’, especially within a religious context. Since when?
This, however, is certainly not true. Myths have always conveyed a truth, but not necessarily stirred one to act. Religious practice is not the fruit of religious mythologies; rather they are often born out of in the practical realities of a society and are certainly developed through practical reason.
Most concerning of all, however, Armstrong’s belief that theologians never worried about ‘proving’ God’s existence. Theologians, imbued with Aristotelic thinking, employed philosophy, the science of the day, to argue the existence of God. Thus, they defined God as First Cause, for example. Armstrong seems to engage in an exercise of apologetics (a neo-Platonic one!) instead of recognising that the birth of modern science would have not been possible had religious authorities not adopted (and monopolised) science. The confusion of belief and faith comes from an obtuse understanding and practice of both science and religion. The transcendent cannot be put under the microscope, yet this does not mean that it cannot be enquired by different means, as in the case of mathematical analysis or physics. The religious’ quest, on the other hand, should not stop at affirming God’s existence, but seek to unravel morality for humankind.