Bloody Liberals

I don’t know how Americans have come to restrict their vocabulary so much, but the dichotomy Liberals (which in the US is taken to mean left, from centre-left to loony-left) and Conservatives (meaning right-wing) seriously distorts any meaningful understanding of political science. Such acception empties the term ‘liberal’ of its authentic meaning. Liberal does not mean lefty!!!
When such flawed terminology is applied to morality is epistemologically wrong and just bonkers. It leads to the endorsement of an old-fashioned political duality left/right (what about the true liberals?), which in ethics becomes Manichean. In short: it’s nonsense.
The culprit this time are a group of ‘moral psychologists’, including Professor Jonathan Haidt, who has caused me great irritation by entering the world of political theory, philosophy and theology with the instruments of biology. It's a bit like analysing a poem with a ruler.
I’m not against moral psychology per se. It seems obvious to me that human beings, as part of the natural world, would have biological traits that would support the development of ideas and morality. You can’t play music without an instrument (I include the voice as instrument). I have no problem even accepting that some people might have a certain predisposition to behaving in a ‘moral’ way, such as giving to charity, having compassion of others etc. This is why, at least in Judaism, charity is charity when it involves a ‘sacrifice’, when it ‘pains’ you in some way. But this stuff is seriously flawed.

The ‘fun’ part are the tests. Haidt has researched the phenomenon of disgust, but his interpretation of the term is a bit off the wall and its application in the tests simply puzzling. I mean, one might not find eating paper disgusting, but if the question asks you to choose between a piece of fruit and paper, isn’t the one who chooses paper just an eejit?
It turns out my ‘disgust’ scale is higher than average. For Haidt this should mean that I have a strong sense of purity/sanctity, which is linked to mortality, the body, blood etc. I take it to mean that I have good manners!
They are clearly (badly) designed for Americans and many questions just don’t make sense. For example:

- Say something bad about your nation (which you don't believe to be true) while calling in, anonymously, to a talk-radio show in a foreign nation.

Err, just read my blog! I do mean what I say though when I write about Italy and the UK. I do not, however, ascribe the problems I encounter with both countries to inherent characteristics of the (ever changing) populations. I'd like to think my whinges are analyses of the socio-political situation at the present moment.

- Curse the founders or early heroes of your country (in private, nobody hears you).

If it’s in private and if they are dead, what’s the point of cursing them? Seriously, in Europe this doesn't make any sense. Besides, what is a 'curse'? A complaint? An insult? A shout for help? An attempt to break free from authority and affirm one's personhood?

- Renounce your citizenship and take one of another country.

I am a EU citizen, which means there’s no point in changing it to another European national citizenship. I wouldn’t give up my EU citizenship because it gives me more rights than probably any other. Besides, giving it up would require moving or applying for permanent leave and so on. I'm, of course, culturally European but citizenship is a legal category.


The problem with Haidt’s theory. These tests seem to aim to identify a 'instinctive' morality, however morality is contextual. There are always
conditions one is in and consequences for one's action. That's why biology can't measure it.
Haidt has developed the psychological understanding of morality from matters of harm, rights and justice to include other categories such as loyalty and authority, thus going beyond the individual. He claims that there are five psychological foundations for the world’s many moralities: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.
He also claims “Cultures vary on the degree to which they build virtues on these five foundations. As a first approximation, political liberals value virtues based on the first two foundations, while political conservatives value virtues based on all five. A consequence of this thesis is that justice and related virtues (based on the fairness foundation) make up half of the moral world for liberals, while justice-related concerns make up only one fifth of the moral world for conservatives.”

Haidt misses the point. He wants people to get on so if liberals and conservatives could understand each other a bit more, the world would be a better place. The point of Liberalism (European acception) is that you do not impose your morals on others. I might be part of a religious/political/cultural community, but I have the right to criticise it, act according to what I think is right, not just what the group or authority decides. So Haidt’s harm and fairness should be replaced with freedom of choice.

1. Language: Haidt makes assumptions about the meaning of the words he employs. This is evident in the tests, where one needs to apply their intended meaning and restrict one’s answers. For example, he mentions chastity in relation to purity/sanctity, what does it mean? To me, chastity can refer to many things, not just sexuality. When referred to sexuality, I interpret it as sex in a respectful and meaningful relationship, since I believe that there is something sacred about (respectful) relationships, love and sexuality (this interpretation of chastity is also part of the Vatican thinking). I would not interpret it, however, as ‘no sex before marriage’. However, I fear that Haidt attaches that narrow meaning to the world. Not to mention ‘purity’ which in Judaism is a rather difficult concept best explained as immanence. It follows that it gets interpreted and re-interpreted according to the context. Haidt’s rigidity of interpretation makes the whole exercise pointless.

2. Liberalism vs. Communitarianism: Haidt could have referred to the dichotomy of liberalism/communitarianism (which might require some political science). Of course, in this context, liberals are NOT Haidt’s lefties. In fact, arguably, many concerns of social justice come from the communitarian tradition rather than the liberal one. Haidt mentions policies of positive discrimination which are clearly not policies descending from liberal philosophy (although they might be adopted by liberal parties). As a liberal, I have some problems with communitarianism, however I believe that my liberalism comes from my morality and that our rights and freedoms are dependent on us living in a society. If I were on a desert island, I wouldn’t have any rights or duties, although I could play lots of records without bothering colleagues ;) (sorry, a Radio 4 moment).

3. Liberalism: real liberalism, unlike Haidt’s broad coalition of lefties, rests upon the idea of individual autonomy above community. It does not however mean that the individual is not in the community. Therefore, individual claims need to be adjusted to the ‘claims’ of the community. The idea of authority also presents difficulties. In traditional societies, the male ‘elders’ might have been the authority dictating the rules of behaviour, but we no longer live in a traditional society. The democratic ideal has sunk deeply into our conscience and ‘traditional authority’ has waned. However, if by ‘authority’ we mean legitimate ‘power’ such as the legal system, we are bound by it.

4. Utilitarianism: Haidt’s lack of political analysis seems to justify a utilitarian position with a streak of relativism. He argues that for those of conservative views, their attachment to order and perceived lack of change serves a human need. Morality goes beyond usefulness. You cannot justify harm or injustice on the basis of usefulness. Human beings are not pawns of society. This is fundamental to religion and to liberalism and this is why I think liberalism has moral foundations.

5. Modernity: personal autonomy is a modern philosophical category (and reality!). This means that I might consider the Talmud or the Bible authoritative, however I would interpret its teaching in the light of the ethical principles I derive from my tradition. This means that I don’t read the Bible literally, which is a relatively recent (200yrs) trend anyway!

6. Morality is contextual: in order to understand a situation in its ethical perspective, one needs to consider the conditions in which of the moral agent acts, the likely consequences, what brings the moral agent to act in a certain way. E.g. we can say that adultery is wrong, but if the adulterer has suffered domestic violence for years and fears leaving the spouse, is most definitely not the same. As I argued before, a moral dilemma is NOT about right and wrong, but wrong and wrong (with a bit of right on both sides probably).